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Abstract: 
Using a panel of 265 regions from 24 OECD countries from 1997 to 2007, we explore the impact 
of nation-wide macroeconomic and structural policies on the productivity growth of subnational 
regions. We find that average relationships between nation-wide policies and regional productivity 
growth can hide strong differentiated effects according to the distance to the frontier: relaxing 
employment protection legislation on temporary contracts, lowering barriers to trade and 
investment and increasing trade openness enhances productivity growth in lagging regions, 
whereas reducing barriers to entrepreneurship or higher levels of government debt has a positive 
effect on regions closer to the productivity frontier. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims at analysing the impact of macro-structural factors on the productivity 
growth of regions. These economy-wide factors are generally defined in a uniform way for all 
regions in a given country, but their impact across regions can be very asymmetric. In this 
way, we aim at bridging the gap between national growth and policies designed at the national 
level and their regional impact in terms of productivity growth. At the country level, the 
neoclassical literature has traditionally investigated economic growth using Cobb-Douglas 
production functions (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). This approach evolved towards the 
endogenous growth framework (Lucas, 1988 and Romer, 1986) focusing on understanding 
the country-level drivers of national growth, including country-level policies. In contrast, the 
literature investigating economic growth dynamics at the regional level explains regional 
growth based on region-specific factors. These studies includes models of regional 
convergence (Sala-i-Martin, 1996, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) and more recently models 
of regional growth using frameworks from the New Economic Geography (Minerva and 
Ottaviano, 2009, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2010).2 To this date, a gap remains between 
these two approaches and as a result, there is a need to better understand the link between 
country-level factors and regional economic growth. Recent work has advanced our 
understanding of how the regional dimension maps into and contributes to aggregate growth 
(see OECD, 2011). Che and Spilimbergo (2012) using a limited set of structural reform 
indicators analysed how these factors impact regional convergence; however our knowledge 
of how country-wide factors influence performance at the regional level is still nascent.  
																																								 																				
2	See Breinlich et al. (2013) and OECD (2009) for a review.	
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The country-level factors we examine comprise a broad package of structural policies, 
including product market regulation and labour market legislation, as well as macroeconomic 
factors such as trade exposure, the level of inflation and government debt. We consider their 
effect on the productivity growth of OECD regions, measured as growth in GDP per worker. 
In particular we seek to explore how this impact might vary across regions depending on their 
productivity gap with the most productive region in their country (the frontier region). We 
also examine the pass-through effect by estimating how productivity growth in the frontier 
region affects productivity growth in other regions within a country and the catching-up effect 
by estimating whether regions that are farther from the frontier (lagging regions) grow faster. 
The fact that we are using regional data enables to control for fixed-effects without creating 
the usual collinearity problems with country-wide policy variables, which also may also 
enable to estimate better the effects of these policies.  
We believe our work carries important conclusions for both macro-structural and 
regional policies. Regional policy has evolved over the past decades from a paradigm 
focusing on temporary subsidies and short-term corrections in regional imbalances toward an 
approach focusing on competitiveness and growth with an aim to boost the overall 
performance of countries.3 A criticism of regional transfers during earlier versions of EU 
regional policies has been made for example in Boldrin and Canova (2001) who find that 
productivity in poorer regions was unaffected by the amount of transfers received. The 
authors conclude that these policies simply have a redistributive role without enhancing either 
aggregate growth or that of lagging regions in the EU. More recently, Breidenbach et 
al. (2016) found that the disbursement of EU structural funds is negatively correlated with 
																																								 																				
3	See McCann and Ortega-Argiles (2013) for a detailed description of the changes to EU cohesion policy for 
example.	
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regional growth and does not seem to contribute effectively to foster income convergence 
across regions. Other work on EU regional transfers has highlighted that their overall 
efficiency could be improved by reallocating these transfers towards a select group of target 
regions (Becker et al., 2012). Our paper aims to contribute to the current debate over the 
conditionality of regional transfers whereby unconditional transfers have been deemed 
insufficient and transfers are now increasingly tied to specific structural improvements.4 Our 
results indicate that lagging regions differ from leading regions in their response to national-
wide policies including structural reforms and therefore national policies can anticipate these 
effects in their initial design and or complemented with regionally designed policies. We find 
that average relationships between nation-wide policies and the growth of regions can hide 
strong differentiated effects according to the distance to the frontier: relaxing employment 
protection legislation on temporary contracts, lowering barriers to trade and investment as 
well as increasing trade openness enhances productivity growth in lagging regions, whereas 
reducing barriers to entrepreneurship or higher levels of government debt has a positive effect 
on regions that are closer to the productivity frontier. 
The paper is structured around six sections. In the next section we provide an 
overview of the literature and our conceptual framework. The third section describes the 
model and Section 4 is dedicated to the data. Section 5 presents the results of our estimates as 
well as robustness checks. The final section presents our conclusions. 
2. Conceptual framework and review of the literature  
																																								 																				
4 The heterogeneity of the effect of transfers on regional growth is analysed in Becker et al. (2013), who find that 
regions with better governance and human capital enjoy greater growth in response to EU transfers. 
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Our empirical model is inspired by the model in Bourlès et al. (2013). This is a 
version of the neo-Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by Aghion et al. (1997), which 
highlights that the costs of market restrictions (e.g. regulatory barriers) in upstream sectors 
have an impact on the productivity growth of downstream sectors. The conclusion of their 
model is that the (induced) lack of competition in upstream sectors leads to lower productivity 
growth in downstream sectors.  
In addition, Bourlès et al. (2013) shows the relevance of two factors that have been 
identified in the endogenous growth literature as influencing positively sector productivity 
growth. First, growth at the international technological frontier for a given sector has a 
positive effect on growth in lagging country-sectors: this is called technological pass-through. 
Second, by a catching-up effect, the efficiency gap between this frontier sector and the 
follower sectors also enhances growth in the follower sectors. As highlighted in Acemoglu et 
al. (2006) and Aghion and Howitt (2006), productivity growth in follower countries increases 
in the productivity growth at the world technological frontier (pass-through effect) owing to 
technological spillovers from the frontier and also increases in the productivity gap between 
the follower country and the technological frontier owing to technological adoption (catching-
up effect). A result of this is that regulations that curb competition between firms will reduce 
the incentive for firms to adopt the technology available at the frontier. This will slow down 
the catching-up of follower countries that are far from the technological frontier. Therefore 
the speed of catching-up depends not only on the distance to the frontier, but also indirectly 
on regulations or policies that might affect the distance to the frontier (Bourlès et al., 2013). 
Another consequence is that, as shown in Griffith et al. (2004), countries that invest in R&D 
benefit from a double productivity boost, through greater catching-up possibilities owing to 
innovation and also through easier technological adoption from the frontier. 
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The structural policies that this and previous papers consider can affect productivity 
through two separate and opposing effects, the escape entry effect and the discouragement 
effect.5 In the context of deregulation leading to heightened competition between firms, the 
escape entry effect would prevail in countries with a significant proportion of firms with 
productivity levels near the productivity frontier, and the discouragement effect would prevail 
in countries where most firms are far away from the frontier. In that case, in follower 
countries far from the frontier, the discouragement effect would prevent innovation taking 
place and reduce catching-up. Conversely, where the escape entry effect prevails, competition 
will increase average productivity. This effect may in fact prevail too in lagging countries or 
regions far from the frontier, where higher domestic or foreign competition may increase 
firms’ incentives to adopt better technologies. 
Recent work on the causes of the generalised productivity slowdown in OECD 
countries has also highlighted that there is an apparent average decline of productivity 
catching-up at the firm and sectoral level (OECD, 2015). This stylised fact is also confirmed 
when observing productivity trends in frontier and lagging regions (OECD, 2016). Among the 
drivers that could promote or hinder catching-up, OECD (2015) stresses the relative openness 
of economies to trade and investment, with an essential component associated with the 
participation in global value-added chains (GVCs); the existence of barriers that generate 
disincentives for up-scaling of firms, which in turn prevent firms from reaching the size 
required to face the fixed costs to adopt innovation or enter new markets; and finally, the 
existence of market restrictions that may also prevent the necessary firm selection and 
reallocation mechanisms from fully operating.   
																																								 																				
5	See	Aghion	et	al.	(2004,	2006).	
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We transpose the country-sector framework of Bourlès et al. (2013) at the regional 
level, examining the impact of nation-wide structural policies and macroeconomic factors on 
regional productivity growth, while simultaneously examining the pass-through and the 
catching-up effects. For the former effect we determine whether regional productivity growth 
increases with the growth of the country’s frontier region (i.e. the region with the highest 
productivity level in its country in a given year) and for the latter we determine whether 
regional growth increases in distance to the frontier region.  
Shifting the analysis from the sectoral to the region level necessitates the identification 
of a different set of explanatory variables in the growth regressions. In the rest of this section, 
we explain our choice of explanatory variables.   
Our paper is concerned with the relationships between economic growth and levels of 
product market regulation, which have been studied before at the country level by Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta (2003) for OECD countries. The results in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
indicate that differences in regulatory reform explain part of the cross-country growth 
disparities. The authors find that lower levels of entry barriers and state control enhance 
productivity growth, particularly in countries that lag behind in technology adoption. Their 
study also finds evidence of productivity gains from privatization. These results lead us to 
reflect whether such reforms might explain differences in the growth of subnational regions. 
In addition, we also consider the impact of employment protection legislation (EPL) on 
regional growth.  
Our approach is also related to that of Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), who build a 
country-level “policy-augmented” growth model analysing the effects of macroeconomic 
policies such as inflation targeting, fiscal policy or international trade on national economic 
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growth in OECD countries. Their findings suggest that high inflation hinders output growth, 
possibly due to its negative effect on investment and capital accumulation. Their study also 
find a negative effect of the size of government on growth, whereas trade exposure is found to 
be positively associated with output growth.  
As highlighted in Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), government deficit can affect 
country-level growth by reducing private sector investment, and by implying a level of 
taxation that changes the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. In spite of the 
positive effects of public spending, medium to high levels of deficit tend to curb economic 
growth. The magnitude of the effect depends on the type of financing of the deficit (i.e. how 
distortionary the taxes are) and the type of public investment undertaken (i.e. how productive 
it is). At the regional level, in contrast to Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), by estimating the 
effect of local taxes and public expenditures on regional economic growth in Korea, Kim 
(1997) finds that overall the positive effect of local government investment on regional 
growth outweighs the negative effect of local taxes. Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2003) also 
find a small positive impact of European structural funds on regional growth in the EU. As 
regional policy funds are typically targeted on gaps of regional GDP per capita, depending on 
the distance to the frontier, the balance between positive and negative effects may change.  
International trade can also enhance economic growth, by reinforcing the efficient 
allocation of resources according to patterns of comparative advantage, by increasing the 
scale of production, facilitating the flow of technologies and knowledge, and increasing levels 
of competition. The New Economic Geography and growth literature, in particular Martin and 
Ottaviano (1999) suggest there is a permanent effect of trade integration on economic growth. 
In contrast, Minniti and Parello (2011), using a spatial model of endogenous growth, predict 
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that trade integration has only a short term impact on growth, which is positive when there are 
positive R&D spillovers. In terms of empirical evidence, Sachs et al. (2002), aiming to 
explain the differences in economic performance across Indian states, find that after the 
reforms of 1991 the surge in international trade has been a positive factor of growth.  
Concerning inflation, despite evidence of its growth effects at the country level 
(Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001), no clear predictions can be made on its effects on regional 
productivity. We therefore treat it as a control variable given its importance as one of the 
macroeconomic stabilisation indicators. 
Among the structural policies in our model, we select reforms aimed at lowering 
employment protection legislation, state control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to 
trade and investment. All these structural variables may affect regional productivity in a 
differentiated way depending on the distance to the frontier.  
From the outset, it could be noted that the majority of the frontier regions in the 
OECD contain large cities, whereas most lagging regions are located in intermediate and 
predominantly rural areas (OECD, 2016). In this context, lagging regions may be particularly 
sensitive to barriers to entrepreneurship precisely because they do not fully benefit from 
density and agglomeration effects associated with the presence of other firms allowing for 
specialisation or knowledge spillovers. Indeed, Stephens et al. (2013), focusing on lagging 
rural regions of the Appalachians in the USA, find that, in such regions, employment growth 
is better enhanced by the presence of creative workers or a tradition of self-employment and 
entrepreneurship in the area than by knowledge-based factors such as the presence of 
universities, a greater proportion of patents or higher high-technology employment shares. 
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The openness of international trade and investment may also affect regions differently. 
OECD (2016) finds that exposure to tradable sectors appears to be one of the main drivers of 
the regional productivity catching-up in lagging regions. A possible explanation is that in 
tradable sectors (mainly industry), the international competitive pressures generate a sort of 
unconditional convergence (Rodrik, 2013), which is less dependent on specific country or 
regional conditions. The barriers to trade and investment could then be particularly 
detrimental for the productivity performance of the lagging regions.      
State control can have different effects on regional growth depending on the form it 
takes and on the distance to the frontier. The extent of state ownership with direct control on 
public employment and investment can be a strong factor of growth in regions farther away 
from the frontier. On the other hand, state involvement in business operations, such as price 
controls and regulation can also reduce the efficient allocation of resources and affect 
incentives to innovate, with a detrimental impact on growth in frontier regions.  
High levels of employment protection legislation (EPL) can have a limiting effect on 
competition and on creative destruction by reducing the flexibility of firm size: this can 
restrict up-scaling of firms but also limit the exit or downsizing of inefficient firms. By 
lowering the quality of job-market matching, it can also prevent effective resource 
reallocation with a detrimental effect on aggregate productivity growth. Lowering restrictions 
on temporary contracts can have a stronger effect on growth for regions that are farther away 
from the frontier, as these generally have thinner labour markets and are therefore more 
vulnerable to labour market rigidities.    
We limit our analysis to the main structural reform and macroeconomic indicators. 
This is both motivated by the existence of institutional data and composite indicators that 
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allow for a comparative analysis across countries and, also, by the fact that these macro-
structural variables have been used to implement ex-ante conditionalities associated with EU 
regional policy funds.   
Our empirical framework focuses on pass-through, catching-up and structural 
framework conditions. It also accounts for time-invariant regional drivers of growth. It does 
not explicitly control for other time-varying region-level drivers of regional growth such as 
physical and human capital and innovation. Although at the country level both the 
neoclassical theory of growth (starting with Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956) and endogenous 
growth models (Romer, 1986 and 1990, Lucas, 1988 and Aghion and Howitt, 1998) 
emphasise the role of physical and human capital accumulation on economic growth, the 
evidence at the regional level is mixed. Chandra and Thompson (2000) and Michaels (2008) 
find that improved access to interstate highways in rural US counties increased firm earnings 
and Duranton and Turner (2011) find that population growth in US Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas responds positively to increases in the road network. However Crescenzi and 
Rodriguez-Pose (2012) fail to find a role for transport infrastructure in regional economic 
growth among EU regions. Turning to human capital, although empirical evidence on the 
importance of human capital for regional growth can be found in Glaeser et al. (1995), 
Henderson et al. (1995) and Rauch (1993), we do not find such evidence in terms of l abour 
productivity growth. Similarly, we do not find in our data a relationship between innovative 
activity and regional productivity growth, at least at the TL2 level.6  Obviously, in level 
terms, high intensity of innovation indicators R&D, patents), is highly correlated with high 
levels of regional labour productivity.  
																																								 																				
6	For evidence on the convergence of R&D policies across regions see OECD (2016).  
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Our paper is part of a limited set of studies that have combined the notions of 
macroeconomic policies, regional economic growth and convergence. Studying the case of 
Indian states, Ahluwalia (2000) discusses the reasons for inter-state differences in economic 
growth in India in the 1990s. He finds that variations in growth are best explained by 
variations in certain state-specific characteristics. However, he does not provide empirical 
evidence on how nation-wide structural reforms can have different impacts on states as these 
differ in their characteristics. More recently, related work by Che and Spilimbergo (2012) has 
estimated the effect of structural reforms on the speed of convergence between regions in 
developed and developing countries, concluding that financial development, trade openness, 
sound institutions and some labour market reforms favour regional convergence. 
3. Description of the model  
As previously explained, our model is based on a modified version of Bourlès et al. 
(2013) adapted to the regional context. Our policy-augmented growth model is based on a 
regional production function rather than a national one, as is often done in the regional growth 
literature. This specification allows to estimate the effects of macroeconomic and structural 
policies on regional productivity growth and simultaneously measure how this effect varies 
with respect to a region’s distance to the “frontier” or most productive region in the country 
(the catching-up effect) and the direct impact of the frontier region on productivity growth 
(the pass-through effect). Our hypothesis is that regional productivity growth is positively 
related to the productivity growth of the frontier region within the country and positively 
related to the productivity gap with the frontier region (in other words productivity growth 
increases with distance to the productivity frontier as lagging regions catch up). 
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In terms of structural policies, we consider labour market legislation, the level of state 
control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment, which are described 
in the next section. Our macroeconomic variables are trade exposure, government debt and 
inflation. 
We estimate the following reduced form equation: 
∆ ln𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑(,* = 		 𝛽.∆ ln 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑/0,*		 + 	𝛽2	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,*6. + 	𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑙9,*6. +																																									𝛽:𝑃𝑜𝑙9,*6.	. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,*6. + 𝛾( + 𝜁* 	+	𝜀(*																							 (1)                                      
	∆ ln𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑(,* is the percentage growth in region r’s productivity between t-1 and t 
(productivity measured as GDP per worker), ∆ ln𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑/0,*	is the percentage growth of the 
country frontier region’s productivity in year t and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,*6. is the lagged productivity 
gap with the country’s frontier region.  
The variable ∆ ln𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑/0,* is equal to zero if the region r is a frontier region in the given year. 
This is because otherwise if r is a frontier region, there would be perfect collinearity between 
the dependent variable and ∆ ln𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑/0,* and the estimate of 𝛽.	obtained would be biased 
towards the share of frontier regions in our dataset (8%). By doing this, we obtain an estimate 
for 𝛽. that is estimated only over the non-frontier regions. We expect 𝛽.	to be positive as the 
growth of the country frontier region has a positive effect on that of other regions in the same 
country. 
The productivity gap variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,*6.	is defined as	ln ?(@AB,CDE?(@AF0,CDE . The gap is equal to 
zero at the frontier and becomes increasingly negative for regions farther away from the 
frontier.	𝛽2 indicates the (hypothetical) effect of increasing the productivity gap by one unit 
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when policy indicators are set to zero. We expect the marginal effect of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝	to be 
negative: as 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,* takes negative values, increasing 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,* is equivalent to 
decreasing the distance to the frontier, which we expect to reduce the catching-up effect on 
regional growth.7 
𝑃𝑜𝑙9,*6. is the lagged level of the policy variable in country C. In order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the coefficients, we normalise the structural policy indicators (see below). 
Higher values of labour market legislation, state control and barriers to entrepreneurship or 
barriers to trade variables are indicative of lower levels of regulation. Since we are interested 
in the impact of nation-wide factors on different types of regions, and in particular on regions 
depending on their distance to the country’s productivity frontier, each nation-wide policy 
variable is interacted with the productivity gap variable. In our full specification, we include 
all the structural policies together and the three macroeconomic indicators together. We obtain 
the marginal effects of each policy, 	𝛽7 + 𝛽:. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,*6. as well as the corresponding 
confidence intervals. 𝜁t are year-specific effects and γr region fixed-effects that account for 
time-invariant regional factors that influence regional productivity growth.  
We estimate the model using OLS with fixed effects. However the variable 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝(,*6.includes a term which is the lagged dependent variable that in its transformed 
form is correlated with the transformed error term. This would lead to estimation by fixed 
effects being biased. In order to address this, and given the serial correlation in our variables 
																																								 																				
7	This time lag allows reducing part of the possible endogeneity bias between policies and productivity. 
Nonetheless, in our sample, this endogeneity is anyway already minimised by the fact that structural 
policies are defined by central governments (or the EU) and the productivity growth is measured at the 
regional level.  
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and the relatively small number of years in our dataset, we follow Blundell and Bond (1998) 
and also estimate our model using a system-GMM method. 
Noteworthy, the fact that we are using regional data enables to control for fixed-
effects without creating the usual collinearity problems with the country-wide policy 
variables, which often do not display strong time variability.8 
 
4. The data 
Our data consist of a panel of 265 regions from 24 OECD countries9	defined at Territorial 
Level 2 (TL2), taken from the OECD Regional Database and covering the period 1997 to 
2007.10 We observe regional productivity since 1996, defined as GDP per worker, deflated 
with base year 2000 and PPP adjusted in US dollars. We use this measure to compute yearly 
regional productivity growth in percentages. Using the regional productivity data we are able 
to identify the regions which are at the productivity frontier in their country in each year. This 
allows us to compute the productivity growth of the frontier region (∆ ln 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑/0	) and the 
distance between a given region and the country frontier region (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝).  
																																								 																				
8	This is a recurrent problem in many cross-country econometric growth studies using structural policy variables 
that do not display a time dimension or have low time variability. To circumvent this problem, 
researchers often have to revert to pooled or the GLS estimates that may generate bias on their own.  
9 We do not use the full set of OECD countries and regions due to restrictions on data availability. The countries 
covered are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 
10	We prefer to restrain our sample to the pre-crisis period in order to capture the structural effects of policies. 
During an economic depression, structural reforms may have temporary deflationary effects 
counteracting their long-run benefits. This may generate a bias in the estimates of the gains from 
structural reform.    
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Turning to our country-year level policy and macroeconomic variables, our measures of 
regulation are drawn from the OECD’s Product-Market Regulation (PMR) Database.11 The 
PMR indicators are a comprehensive and internationally comparable set of indicators that 
measure the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition in areas of the product 
market where competition is viable. They measure the economy-wide regulatory and market 
environments in 34 OECD countries as well as in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and 
South Africa. They are consistent across time and countries. In the original data, the values 
for each indicator vary between 1 and 6, with higher values indicating higher levels of 
restrictions. To make their interpretation more comparable with the other structural indicators, 
we use the PMR with a reverse scale (i.e. higher values mean lower restrictions). Data are 
gathered and the indicators calculated according to a common method, so as to ensure 
consistency across time and comparability across space and across sectors. We use the three 
main PMR components rather than the composite indicator because the latter combines quite 
different dimensions, possibly affecting regional growth in a very diverse manner. The first is 
State control that measures the extent of state ownership (scope of public enterprise, direct 
control over business enterprises and government involvement in network sectors) and the 
state’s involvement in business operations (price controls, use of command and control 
regulation). The second are Barriers to entrepreneurship that measures regulatory and 
administrative opacity, administrative burdens on start-ups and barriers to competition. 
Finally, Barriers to trade and investment encompasses barriers to FDI, tariffs, discriminatory 
procedures and regulatory barriers to trade and investment. 
																																								 																				
11 See Wolfl et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the PMR data as well as Koske et al. (2015) for a more 
recent update on the PMR data. 
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Our second structural policy area is that of labour market legislation. We use the 
employment protection legislation (EPL) indicator constructed by the OECD’s Directorate for 
Labour and Social Affairs, which varies from 1 to 6 (like for the PMR, we are using here a 
reverse scale, which increases with labour market deregulation). EPL measures the procedures 
and costs involved in dismissing or hiring workers, based on information provided by officials 
in the OECD member countries and expert opinions from the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). EPL indicators are available for all 35 OECD countries as well as for 39 
non-OECD countries and territories. Two EPL indicators were available to us: the first one, 
pertaining to regular contracts, was not retained in our analysis due to the lack of time and 
cross-country variation in this measure; the second one, pertaining to temporary contracts, 
presents considerable variation as this form of employment contracts has been subject to 
reform in many countries in the period we consider. 
In terms of macroeconomic variables, we consider trade openness, captured by total trade 
flows as a percentage of GDP, government debt to GDP ratio, and inflation (measured as the 
rise in the consumer price index). All macroeconomic data are drawn from OECD sources. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables. Annual labour productivity growth 
has an average value of 1.7% and ranges from -7.8% to +13.9%. Outlier observations with 
productivity growth lower than -8% or greater than 14% have been removed from the sample, 
although the frontier region growth is allowed to exceed these values. The productivity gap 
takes on negative values. It is equal to zero for regions at the productivity frontier of their 
country, and becomes increasingly negative for regions further away from the frontier.  
 
5. Results  
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5.1 Impact of structural reforms 
Table 2 reports our results on the effects of structural variables using regional fixed 
effects, pooled OLS and system GMM methods. The first six columns in Table 2 report the 
estimates from fixed effects regressions. In column (1), the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on Frontiergrowth indicates that increasing the productivity growth of 
the country frontier region has a positive effect on the growth of the other regions, as 
expected. The 0.05 coefficient means that a 1 percentage point increase in the annual 
productivity growth of the country frontier region is associated with a 0.05 percentage point 
increase in regional productivity growth. Although the effect is positive and significant, it is 
of small magnitude: the frontier region is the region with the highest productivity level in the 
country and may not have particularly high growth. We further investigate the pass-through 
effect from the frontier in our robustness checks. Turning to the prodgap coefficient, this is 
negative and statistically significant as expected and means that one standard deviation 
increase in the distance to the frontier is associated with a 2.9% higher regional growth. 
In column (6), we include the four policy variables together as well as all interaction terms 
with the productivity gap in a fixed effects specification. The coefficient on Frontiergrowth 
remains unchanged, while the coefficient of -13.95 on the productivity gap represents a 
fictitious case where the value of all the structural variables would be at zero, meaning the 
highest possible levels of regulation. The overall effect of the productivity gap however, 
computed at average levels of the structural variables, is -9.2, meaning that increasing the 
productivity gap by one standard deviation would increase regional growth by 4%.  
Column (7) presents, as a means of comparison, the results obtained from a pooled OLS 
estimation. Without region-specific effects, the effect of the frontier is no longer significant. 
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The cross-section effects dominate, capturing agglomeration forces rather than convergence 
forces. Indeed, regional growth can be the result of convergence and agglomeration forces. 
The former tend to favour lagging or poorer (often low-density, rural) areas. Conversely, the 
agglomeration forces favour the dense, urbanised areas (see Garcilazo and Oliveira Martins, 
2013).  The fixed effects and system GMM with region effects methods however capture the 
convergence forces.  
Figure 1 below represents the marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals of each of 
our four structural reforms, based on the estimations underlying the results reported in column 
(6) of Table 2. Each panel of Figure 1 represents, along the left vertical axis, the marginal 
effect of a one-point increase in the value of the variable (i.e. greater deregulation) on regional 
productivity growth, at different levels of the productivity gap with the frontier region. In 
addition, each panel shows, according to the right vertical axis, the histogram of the 
productivity gap variable. This enables us to see the magnitude and the significance of the 
marginal effects, over a meaningful range of the productivity gap. 
Figure 1 shows that deregulating temporary contracts EPL has a small negative effect on 
the productivity growth of regions that are near the frontier, whilst the effect is large and 
positive for a relatively small number of regions with a productivity gap lower than -0.6. The 
positive effect on growth increases in the productivity gap. For the middle range of regions, 
the marginal effect of deregulating EPL is not significantly different from zero. Deregulating 
State Control seems to have no significant effect on regions close to the frontier, while there 
is an increasingly negative impact on growth points for regions with a productivity gap 
smaller than -0.4 as they get further from the frontier. Turning to barriers to entrepreneurship, 
in this specification deregulation appears to have no significant effect on the growth of most 
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regions (with a productivity gap greater than -0.6) while there is a positive and significant 
effect on lagging regions that increases with distance to the frontier. Finally, reducing barriers 
to trade and investment has a negative and significant effect for the middle range of regions, 
with a larger negative impact on regions as their distance to the frontier increases. 
Figure 1: Marginal effects of structural reforms, OLS Fixed-effects 
 
As explained in Section 3, our preferred estimation method is system GMM. The 
corresponding results in column (8) of Table 2 confirm the pass-through effect of the frontier 
region with a highly significant coefficient of +0.07 on the frontier region growth. The graphs 
in Figure 2 below represent the marginal effects obtained from this specification. The system 
GMM estimation yields very similar results for EPL. Intuitively, this differential impact of 
labour market legislation among different kinds of regions can be driven by agglomeration 
effects. Labour markets in regions close to the frontier are likely to be “thicker”, with larger 
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and more diverse populations of workers. Other things being equal, labour-market rigidities 
are likely to be less costly in thicker labour markets and in those that are better endowed with 
skills, because skill supply and matching are likely to be easier under any given regulatory 
regime. Regulatory rigidities in labour markets are likely to exact a much higher price in 
regions farther from the frontier.  
Figure 2: Marginal effects of structural reforms, GMM 
 
In this preferred specification, the effects of deregulating state control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment on regional growth are no longer 
significant over the entire range of productivity gap. We now investigate this further by using 
an alternative definition of the frontier as well as checking for sample selection issues. 
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Robustness checks 
Our results may be sensitive to specificities of our data or to the way in which we have 
defined a single frontier region for each country. We first consider the possibility that the 
presence of frontier regions in our dataset for analysis may influence our results. We remove 
from our data all the observations that correspond to a country’s frontier region in any given 
year. As a result, we are left with 2,281 observations for which the productivity gap is not 
zero. Results are presented in Table 3. The marginal effects computed from the results of the 
OLS and system GMM specifications of columns (6) and (7) respectively are shown 
graphically in Figures 3 and 4 below. 
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Figure 3: Exclusion of frontier regions, OLS Fixed-effects
 
Figure 4: Exclusion of frontier regions, system GMM 
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Results from the OLS with fixed effects specification are similar to those obtained 
previously. Focusing on our GMM results (Figure 4), the positive effect of labour market 
deregulation on lagging regions is confirmed, while deregulating barriers to trade and 
investment now has a positive and significant effect on lagging regions, that increases with 
distance to the frontier.  
Similarly, in Table 4 we remove the observations corresponding to the top-three regions 
with the highest productivity in each country in each year. This estimates the effects of the 
frontier and of structural policies on the periphery. The pass-through and catching-up effects 
are robust as indicated by the coefficients in column (1). Figures 5 and 6 below represent the 
marginal effects obtained from the OLS and GMM estimations of columns (6) and (7).  
Again, the fixed effects results are very similar to those obtained from the whole sample, 
with more pronounced effects of EPL and barriers to trade (Figure 5). Turning to the GMM 
results in Figure 6, we find that again reducing labour market rigidities on temporary 
contracts has a positive effect on growth for lagging regions; reducing barriers to 
entrepreneurship has a positive and significant effect for a range of regions close to the 
productivity frontier, with the largest effect closer to the frontier, and reducing barriers to 
trade and investment still has a clear positive and significant impact on growth for lagging 
regions. The effect of state control again is not significant for lagging regions although there 
is a negative and significant effect of deregulating state control on growth near the frontier. 
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Figure 5: Excluding the top three regions, OLS. 
 
Figure 6: Excluding the top three regions, GMM. 
 
 
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 E
PL
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−1
8
−1
6
−1
4
−1
2
−1
0
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 S
ta
te
 C
on
tro
l
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 B
ar
rie
rs
 to
 E
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
hip
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−2
0
−1
8
−1
6
−1
4
−1
2
−1
0
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 B
ar
rie
rs
 to
 T
ra
de
 a
nd
 In
ve
stm
en
t
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
Structural policies − F.E. − top 3 regions excluded
Marginal effects on productivity growth
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 E
PL
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 S
ta
te
 C
on
tro
l
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−1
8
−1
6
−1
4
−1
2
−1
0
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 B
ar
rie
rs
 to
 E
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
hip
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
81
01
21
41
61
82
02
22
42
62
83
03
23
43
63
84
0
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 B
ar
rie
rs
 to
 T
ra
de
 a
nd
 In
ve
stm
en
t
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
Structural policies − System GMM − top 3 regions excluded
Marginal effects on productivity growth
 	 26	
Another possible important bias may come from our definition of the frontier regions. 
Instead of using the region with the highest productivity in region r’s country, we propose an 
alternative definition of the frontier by creating a synthetic frontier where the productivity is 
equal to the average productivity in the three most productive regions in the country in a 
particular year. We also compute an alternative measure of the distance to the frontier, which 
is now equal to the difference between the log of productivity of region r and the log of the 
average productivity of the three most productive regions. We then remove from our dataset 
the three regions that were used in order to create the synthetic frontier region. This is to 
avoid having a positive productivity gap between the highest productivity region and the 
synthetic average and to capture the effect of this synthetic frontier and of the policies on 
those regions that are not part of this frontier. 
The results in Table 5 show that regional growth increases in the growth of the synthetic 
frontier, it also increases in the distance to the synthetic frontier, as presented in our base 
results in Table 2. It is noteworthy that the pass-through effect estimated here is much larger 
than that identified in Table 2 with the full sample or even in Table 4 without the top three 
regions: a one percentage point increase in the growth of the synthetic frontier is associated 
with a 0.3 point increase in regional growth for the other regions. For all regions except the 
three most productive, the pass-through of the economic core of the country is more 
meaningful than that of the single frontier region. We therefore focus on this particular 
definition of the frontier and the results associated with it. 
The marginal effects are depicted in Figure 7 (OLS with region fixed effects) and Figure 8 
(GMM) below. Given the new definition of the frontier and the exclusion of the top three 
regions, the distribution of the productivity gap variable has changed, with a higher minimum 
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(-2.94) and a lower maximum (-0.003). This is reflected in the horizontal axis and in the 
histograms represented on both figures.   
Figure 7: Alternative frontier region, excluding the top three regions, OLS. 
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Figure 8: Alternative frontier region, excluding the top three regions, GMM. 
 
Figure 8 above confirms the patterns found on EPL. For lagging regions, the reduction in 
rigidities in temporary contracts acts in favour of reallocation and labour market 
experimentation, while for regions near the frontier, deregulating temporary contracts might 
in fact prevent the accumulation of specific capital in firms. For a region with a productivity 
gap of -0.7, a one-point increase in the EPL indicator (just less than one standard deviation) is 
associated with an increase in productivity growth of 1 percentage point. For a region with a 
productivity gap of -1.5, the same amount of deregulation is associated with an increase in 
growth of 4.8 points.      
While the marginal effect of deregulating state control is positive and increasing in 
distance to the frontier, it is still insignificant. This could be due to the different aspects of 
state control in this variable having counteracting effects. We also find that reducing barriers 
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to entrepreneurship has a positive and significant effect on regional growth for a large range 
of regions with productivity gap greater than -0.9. This effect increases for regions closer to 
the frontier. For example, for a region with a productivity gap of -0.5, increasing the policy 
indicator by one point (roughly two standard deviations) is associated with a 3.4 point 
increase in productivity growth, whilst for a region with a productivity gap of -0.3, the 
marginal effect is 4.3 growth points. For regions farther from the frontier, contrary to our 
expectations, the effect of reducing barriers to entrepreneurship is insignificant: The 
discouragement effect may be prevailing in these regions as competition increases with the 
lowering of these barriers.  
Turning to barriers to trade and investment, as expected, a reduction of this type of 
rigidities has a positive and significant effect on growth for the range of regions farther away 
from the frontier (with a productivity gap less than -0.5). For example, for a region with a 
productivity gap of -0.5, increasing the policy indicator by one point (here also roughly two 
standard deviations) is associated with a 1.2 point increase in productivity growth. For a 
region with a productivity gap of -1, the effect of the same increase in the policy indicator is a 
4.64 point increase in productivity growth. Although the effects estimated on lagging regions 
are very large, they remain of a more realistic magnitude over the main range of regions in 
our dataset. 
Finally, given the time period of our analysis it could be argued that Poland, Ireland and 
Spain could have an overly important weight on the results. During the pre-crisis period, these 
three countries experienced particularly rapid growth and undertook important structural 
reforms. Accordingly, we replicated our base estimates after removing Polish, Irish and 
Spanish regions from our sample (see Table 6). Marginal coefficients represented in Figures 
9-11 show that our results are robust to the exclusion of these countries.  
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Figure 9: Excluding Spanish regions. 
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Figure 10: Excluding Polish regions. 
 
Figure 11: Excluding Irish regions. 
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5.3 Impact of macroeconomic factors 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the macroeconomic variables. Table 7 reports our base results 
using the full dataset and the single frontier region. The first three robustness checks, 
including the alternative definition of the frontier, are offered in Table 8. Table 9 shows the 
results obtained once we exclude Polish, Spanish and Irish regions. Again, the coefficient on 
frontier region growth is highly significant and robust across specifications. We show below 
in Figures 12-18 the marginal coefficients obtained from our preferred GMM estimations. 
Figures from the OLS with region fixed effects estimations are included in the appendix.  
Figure 12 corresponds to the results from column (7) in Table 7. As expected, 
increasing trade exposure has a positive and significant effect on regions with large 
productivity gaps (values less than -1.3). For a region with a productivity gap of -1.5, 
increasing trade openness by one standard deviation is associated with a 4.32 point increase in 
growth. However, we also find a negative and significant effect on regions close to the 
frontier (values greater than -0.6).  For a region with a productivity gap of -0.5, increasing 
trade openness by one standard deviation is associated with a 1.76 point decrease in growth. 
These results are similar to and consistent with those found on the effects of liberalising trade 
and investment (Figures 2 and 8) and they are robust to our modifications in the sample and 
the definition of the frontier presented in Figures 13-18 and Tables 8 and 9. They however go 
against the theory that, in regions close to the productivity frontier, heightened competition 
brought about by greater trade and investment would stimulate the escape entry effect, raising 
productivity. In our less stringent, alternative definition of the frontier however (Figure 15), 
the negative effect of trade exposure is only significant for a smaller range of regions very 
close to the frontier. Overall, both estimates on structural policies and on macroeconomic 
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factors support the hypothesis that exposure to international trade has an enhancing effect on 
regional productivity growth, at least for regions far enough from the frontier. As explained in 
Section 2, a possible explanation could be related to the role of the tradable sector as an 
engine of unconditional growth (Rodrik, 2013).  
Figure 12: Marginal effects of macroeconomic variables, GMM. 
 
Government debt has a positive and significant effect on regional growth that 
increases with distance to the frontier.12 In the base results, for a region with a productivity 
gap of -0.5, increasing government debt (as a percentage of GDP) by one standard deviation 
is associated with a 1.1 point increase in growth. For a region farther from the frontier, with a 
productivity gap of -1.5, the same increase in government debt would yield a 1.7 point 
increase in growth. In our alternative specifications, although the effect of debt remains 
																																								 																				
12	Note that this is the effect of increases in debt over time due to the inclusion of region fixed effects.	
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positive and significant and of similar magnitude for a range of regions not too far from the 
frontier, the effect is now (very mildly) decreasing with distance to the frontier. As shown in 
Figure 15, when we use the average frontier and exclude the top three regions, the effect of 
government debt is positive and significant for regions with values of the productivity gap 
greater than -1.3 and the effect is no longer precisely estimated for the small number of 
regions farther from the frontier. For a region with a productivity gap of -0.5, increasing 
government debt by one standard deviation is associated with a 1.5 point increase in growth. 
As can be seen from our results in Figures 12-18, the positive effect of government debt on 
regional growth for a meaningful range of regions is robust across our specifications. It is 
puzzling that, when we remove the frontier regions, we are not able to find a significant 
positive effect of debt on lagging regions, whilst these regions are most likely to be on the 
receiving end of public investment. 
Finally, throughout our estimations, we do not find evidence of a significant role of 
inflation in regional growth. This is not due to a lack of time variation in our data. Rather, as 
explained in Section 2, this variable is included as one of the macroeconomic imbalance 
indicators but there is no clear prediction on its differential effect on regional growth. For 
example, inflation in lagging regions may affect export competitiveness due to the price of 
their exports increasing, while at the same time reducing the cost of imported intermediates. If 
lagging regions are particularly sensitive to increases in trade openness, as our results show, 
we may expect inflation increases to affect their productivity growth, but the net effect would 
be unclear.          
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Figure 13: Excluding frontier regions. 
 
Figure 14: Excluding top three regions. 
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Figure 15: Alternative frontier region. 
 
Figure 16: Excluding Spanish regions. 
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Figure 17: Excluding Polish regions. 
 
Figure 18: Excluding Irish regions. 
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6. Conclusions 
 Our analysis measures the effects of country-wide macroeconomic and structural 
factors on regional performance. We consider both the effects of regulatory policies and 
macroeconomic factors on regional productivity using a panel covering 265 regions from 24 
OECD countries over the period 1997-2007 representing roughly three business cycles. We 
find strong statistical links between economy-wide macroeconomic and structural policies and 
regional productivity that are not homogenous across regions; they tend to vary with respect 
to the distance of regions to their national productivity frontier, with typically lagging regions 
being the most affected by rigidities in product and labour markets. In addition, our analysis 
finds evidence of a catching up effect with faster productivity growth in lagging regions and 
evidence of a pass-through effect where growth in the frontier regions boosts the productivity 
growth of the other regions. In particular, the effect of the frontier is more pronounced for 
peripheral regions than for regions immediately following the frontier in terms of 
productivity. We also find that the top three most productive regions, which we can consider 
the core of each country, have a stronger effect on regional growth than the single most 
productive region. 
Our estimates reveal that deregulating employment protection legislation in temporary 
contracts or reducing the level of barriers to trade and investment has a strong positive effect 
on the growth of lagging regions and that this increases in distance to the frontier. The 
increase in regional growth from deregulating EPL of temporary contracts by one point on the 
indicator scale (0.8 of a standard deviation) varies from 1 to 4.8 growth points between a 
region at a productivity gap of -0.7 and another region at a productivity gap of -1.5. 
Deregulating barriers to trade and investment by one point (roughly two standard deviations) 
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is associated with 1.2 point higher regional growth for a region with a productivity gap of -0.5 
and 4.6 points for a region with a productivity gap of -1.  
The effect of international trade is confirmed in our separate results on macroeconomic 
factors: increasing trade openness (expressed as trade volume as a percentage of GDP) at the 
country level increases regional growth of regions that are far from the productivity frontier, 
with a more pronounced effect for lagging regions. 
On the other hand, reducing barriers to entrepreneurship increases productivity growth for 
regions closer to the frontier: for a region with a productivity gap of -0.5, deregulating 
barriers to entrepreneurship by one point (roughly two standard deviations) is associated with 
a 3.4 point increase in growth. This effect is larger for regions nearer the frontier but in our 
GMM results we do not find a significant effect on regions that are the most lagging. We also 
fail to find a significant effect of reducing state control on regional growth, across the range 
of regions with our GMM specification.  
Our findings also indicate that government debt has a positive and significant effect on 
growth for most regions with values of the productivity gap greater than -1.3.  For a region 
with a productivity gap of -0.5, increasing government debt by one standard deviation is 
associated with a 1.5 point increase in growth and the magnitude of the effect is larger for 
regions nearer the frontier.  
These findings reveal a strong link between the national and the regional dimension which 
carries important policy implications. First, they help to understand how national factors have 
a differentiated impact across regions enabling us to better assess their overall effects. Our 
results also suggest that structural and macroeconomic policies should account for these 
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regional effects in their design by complementing these policies with policies targeted to 
specific regions to enhance their effects or restrain their negative effects.  
Finally, arguments against regulatory reform have been made on the basis of harming 
vulnerable or strategic regions. Our results do not warrant these views. On the contrary, 
macro-structural policies tend to support catching-up of the lagging regions. This also 
provides some basis to justify conditionalities associated with structural reforms. Our results 
show that regulatory effects tend to vary according to regions’ distance to the frontier, they 
also highlight the fact that different forms of regulation have different regional impacts.  
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Tables  
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Productivity levels (US$ constant prices) 60730.7 36522.7 14169.69 609012.8 
Productivity growth 1.69 3.04 -7.84 13.9 
Frontier region growth 3.66 6.42 -10.57 64.68 
Productivity gap -0.43 0.43 -3.7 0 
EPL temporary contracts 4.47 1.21 1.25 5.75 
PMR state control 3.52 0.79 1.76 4.85 
PMR barriers to entrepreneurship 3.71 0.54 2.55 4.56 
PMR barriers to trade and investment 5.14 0.53 2.85 5.77 
Trade openness (X+M)/GDP 31.17 16.05 9.48 92.37 
Debt as % of GDP 66.77 28.13 12.6 175.27 
Inflation rate (in %) 2.36 1.65 -0.9 14.15 
Source: Own calculations using data from OECD Regional Database, OECD PMR Database, 
OECD EPL Database and OECD Economic Outlook Database. 
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Table 2: Structural reforms and regional growth 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: regional 
productivity growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
FE FE FE FE FE FE Pooled OLS 
System 
GMM 
         
Frontiergrowth  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.03 0.07*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) 
Productivity gap t-1 -6.80*** 1.48 -2.37 -4.77*** -5.52* -13.95** 7.28** 12.59 
 
(1.310) (1.877) (2.499) (1.419) (2.952) (5.996) (2.889) (9.414) 
EPL temp t-1 
 
-0.95*** 
   
-1.19*** 0.30* -1.51*** 
  
(0.254) 
   
(0.292) (0.169) (0.403) 
EPL temp X prodgap t-1 
 
-2.27*** 
   
-2.51*** -0.66* -3.95*** 
  
(0.384) 
   
(0.459) (0.349) (0.607) 
Statecontrol t-1 
  
-0.72** 
  
0.20 -0.22 -0.45 
   
(0.339) 
  
(0.463) (0.220) (0.643) 
Statecontrol X prodgap t-1 
  
-1.29** 
  
2.87*** 0.58 -0.71 
   
(0.609) 
  
(0.902) (0.440) (1.561) 
Barrierstoentr t-1 
   
-0.43 
 
0.18 -0.75*** 1.02 
    
(0.408) 
 
(0.516) (0.259) (0.716) 
Barrierstoentr X prodgap t-1 
   
-0.64*** 
 
-1.08** -0.15 0.91 
    
(0.163) 
 
(0.456) (0.265) (0.667) 
Barrierstotrade t-1 
    
-0.19 0.17 -0.94*** -1.30** 
     
(0.355) (0.631) (0.263) (0.640) 
Barrierstotrade X prodgap t-1 
    
-0.25 1.92* -1.18** -2.37* 
     
(0.517) (1.161) (0.576) (1.361) 
N 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 
R2 0.087 0.103 0.089 0.091 0.087 0.110 0.112 
 AR(1) 
       
0.000 
AR(2) 
       
0.115 
Sargan 
       
0.000 
Number of instruments 
       
337 
Number of regions 265 265 265 265 265 265  265 
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: Sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of frontier regions 
 Dependent variable: regional 
productivity growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
FE FE FE FE FE FE System GMM 
                
Frontiergrowth 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) 
Productivity gap t-1 -7.31*** 1.68 -1.83 -5.37*** -6.25** -16.90*** 21.74** 
 
(1.402) (1.948) (2.635) (1.511) (3.089) (6.436) (10.801) 
EPL temp t-1 
 
-1.12*** 
   
-1.48*** -1.95*** 
  
(0.259) 
   
(0.337) (0.439) 
EPL temp X prodgap t-1 
 
-2.48*** 
   
-2.85*** -4.48*** 
  
(0.390) 
   
(0.511) (0.678) 
Statecontrol t-1 
  
-0.85** 
  
0.44 -0.72 
   
(0.340) 
  
(0.502) (0.696) 
Statecontrol X prodgap t-1 
  
-1.62** 
  
3.14*** -1.43 
   
(0.639) 
  
(0.969) (1.702) 
Barrierstoentr t-1 
   
-0.34 
 
0.52 1.70** 
    
(0.439) 
 
(0.592) (0.838) 
Barrierstoentr X prodgap t-1 
   
-0.65*** 
 
-1.15** 1.61** 
    
(0.172) 
 
(0.500) (0.774) 
Barrierstotrade t-1 
    
-0.12 0.52 -2.06** 
     
(0.376) (0.703) (0.865) 
Barrierstotrade X prodgap t-1 
    
-0.21 2.47** -3.89** 
     
(0.543) (1.245) (1.698) 
N 2,281 2,281 2,281 2,281 2,281 2,281 2,281 
R2 0.094 0.114 0.098 0.099 0.095 0.123 
 AR(1) 
      
0.000 
AR(2) 
      
0.182 
Sargan 
      
0.000 
Number of instruments 
      
321 
Number of regions 249 249 249 249 249 249 249  
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of the top 3 productivity regions 
 Dependent variable: 
regional productivity 
growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
FE FE FE FE FE FE 
System 
GMM 
                
Frontiergrowth 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Productivity gap t-1 -6.37*** 2.90 1.25 -5.02*** -5.69 -16.23** 43.15*** 
 
(1.603) (2.035) (2.829) (1.706) (3.453) (7.987) (16.085) 
EPL temp t-1 
 
-1.38*** 
   
-1.92*** -2.48*** 
  
(0.275) 
   
(0.388) (0.497) 
EPL temp X prodgap t-1 
 
-2.62*** 
   
-3.12*** -4.69*** 
  
(0.397) 
   
(0.551) (0.749) 
Statecontrol t-1 
  
-1.25*** 
  
-0.11 -2.50*** 
   
(0.323) 
  
(0.543) (0.823) 
Statecontrol X prodgap t-1 
  
-2.28*** 
  
2.57** -4.64* 
   
(0.690) 
  
(1.140) (2.458) 
Barrierstoentr t-1 
   
0.04 
 
1.64** 3.72*** 
    
(0.479) 
 
(0.725) (0.992) 
Barrierstoentr X prodgap t-1 
   
-0.54*** 
 
-0.79 3.41*** 
    
(0.167) 
 
(0.611) (1.087) 
Barrierstotrade t-1 
    
-0.03 0.69 -3.62*** 
     
(0.436) (0.936) (1.265) 
Barrierstotrade X prodgap t-1 
    
-0.13 2.77* -6.75*** 
     
(0.607) (1.577) (2.526) 
N 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 
R2 0.098 0.124 0.105 0.104 0.098 0.139 
 AR(1) 
      
0.000 
AR(2) 
      
0.123 
Sargan 
      
0.000 
Number of instruments 
      
288 
Number of regions 216 216 216 216 216 216  216 
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity of the results to an alternative definition of frontier regions 
 Dependent variable: 
regional productivity growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
FE FE FE FE FE FE System GMM 
                
Frontiergrowth 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) 
Productivity gap t-1 -16.71*** -8.65*** -10.81*** -17.76*** -14.88*** -21.50** 30.86 
 
(1.954) (2.360) (4.046) (1.976) (4.065) (8.996) (20.563) 
EPL temp t-1 
 
-1.07*** 
   
-1.67*** -2.39*** 
  
(0.275) 
   
(0.374) (0.497) 
EPL temp X prodgap t-1 
 
-2.09*** 
   
-2.78*** -4.81*** 
  
(0.487) 
   
(0.663) (0.811) 
Statecontrol t-1 
  
-0.95*** 
  
-0.85 -2.64*** 
   
(0.356) 
  
(0.556) (0.901) 
Statecontrol X prodgap t-1 
  
-1.79* 
  
1.71 -7.08* 
   
(0.984) 
  
(1.753) (3.688) 
Barrierstoentr t-1 
   
1.63*** 
 
3.45*** 5.62*** 
    
(0.435) 
 
(0.609) (0.807) 
Barrierstoentr X prodgap t-1 
   
-0.13 
 
0.37 4.46*** 
    
(0.212) 
 
(0.639) (1.309) 
Barrierstotrade t-1 
    
0.15 0.23 -2.25** 
     
(0.411) (0.708) (0.964) 
Barrierstotrade X prodgap t-1 
    
-0.41 1.27 -6.89*** 
     
(0.670) (1.461) (2.613) 
N 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 
R2 0.184 0.194 0.187 0.195 0.185 0.219 
 AR(1) 
      
0.000 
AR(2) 
      
0.477 
Sargan 
      
0.000 
Number of instruments 
      
288 
Number of regions 216 216 216 216 216 216  216 
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity of the results to the removal of Spanish, Irish and Polish regions 
 Dependent variable: regional 
productivity growth Without Spain Without Poland Without Ireland 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 FE 
System 
GMM FE 
System 
GMM  FE 
System 
GMM 
              
Frontiergrowth  0.04** 0.06*** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.07*** 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) 
Productivity gap t-1 -14.86** 11.53 -24.73** 22.11 -14.11** 11.77 
 
(5.747) (9.411) (10.877) (16.490) (5.981) (9.382) 
EPL temp t-1 -1.45*** -1.64*** -1.44*** -1.87*** -1.23*** -1.52*** 
 
(0.300) (0.419) (0.293) (0.370) (0.293) (0.405) 
EPL temp X prodgap t-1 -2.75*** -4.01*** -2.12*** -3.80*** -2.54*** -3.96*** 
 
(0.468) (0.628) (0.473) (0.589) (0.461) (0.609) 
Statecontrol t-1 1.30* 0.29 -0.27 -0.51 0.23 -0.41 
 
(0.675) (0.939) (0.426) (0.586) (0.465) (0.643) 
Statecontrol X prodgap t-1 3.96*** -0.08 2.33*** 0.15 2.99*** -0.56 
 
(1.007) (1.711) (0.855) (1.386) (0.905) (1.562) 
Barrierstoentr t-1 -0.06 0.83 0.26 1.45* 0.17 1.01 
 
(0.518) (0.732) (0.513) (0.746) (0.517) (0.716) 
Barrierstoentr X prodgap t-1 -1.20*** 0.77 -1.66** 1.92 -1.09** 0.86 
 
(0.436) (0.668) (0.816) (1.193) (0.454) (0.664) 
Barrierstotrade t-1 0.20 -1.16* 2.39*** -0.84 0.13 -1.28** 
 
(0.583) (0.644) (0.828) (1.242) (0.629) (0.637) 
Barrierstotrade X prodgap t-1 1.78 -2.29* 4.57* -5.33 1.91* -2.28* 
 
(1.081) (1.317) (2.360) (3.363) (1.156) (1.355) 
N 2,309 2,309 2,355 2,355 2,474 2,474 
R2 0.099 
 
0.115 
 
0.109 
 AR(1) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
AR(2) 
 
0.205 
 
0.148 
 
0.116 
Sargan 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Number of instruments 
 
318 
 
321 
 
335 
Number of regions 246 246 249 249 263 263 
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 7: Macroeconomic factors and regional growth 
 Dependent variable: regional 
productivity growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
FE FE FE FE FE Pooled OLS 
System 
GMM 
                
Frontiergrowth  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.06*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) 
Productivity gap t-1 -6.80*** -0.45 -5.91*** -7.74*** -2.76 0.97 2.48 
 
(1.310) (2.240) (1.375) (1.348) (1.996) (0.825) (3.598) 
Trade t-1 
 
-0.19*** 
  
-0.18*** 0.01 -0.30*** 
  
(0.048) 
  
(0.045) (0.008) (0.073) 
Trade X prodgap t-1 
 
-0.19*** 
  
-0.12** -0.03* -0.38*** 
  
(0.058) 
  
(0.048) (0.016) (0.109) 
Debt t-1 
  
0.01 
 
0.02* -0.01*** 0.03* 
   
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.016) 
Debt X prodgap t-1 
  
-0.03*** 
 
-0.02* -0.01* -0.02 
   
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) 
Inflation t-1 
   
0.09 -0.04 0.11 -0.00 
    
(0.072) (0.080) (0.074) (0.121) 
Inflation X prodgap t-1 
   
0.39*** 0.05 0.23 -0.07 
    
(0.135) (0.132) (0.142) (0.207) 
N 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 2,492 
R2 0.087 0.100 0.100 0.091 0.110 0.083 
 AR(1) 
      
0.000 
AR(2) 
      
0.137 
Sargan 
      
0.000 
Number of instruments 
      
335 
Number of regions 265 265 265 265 265    265 
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 8: Robustness checks for the macroeconomic variables 
 
 Dependent variable: 
regional productivity 
growth 
Removing 
frontier regions Removing top 3 regions 
Alternative frontier region - 
removing top 3 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
FE 
System 
GMM FE 
System 
GMM FE 
System 
GMM 
              
Frontiergrowth  0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.038) (0.043) 
Productivity gap t-1 -1.81 5.71 -1.09 5.68 -14.52*** -2.83 
 
(2.114) (3.896) (2.655) (4.560) (3.120) (6.392) 
Trade t-1 -0.24*** -0.45*** -0.26*** -0.52*** -0.07 -0.37*** 
 
(0.049) (0.086) (0.067) (0.099) (0.064) (0.102) 
Trade X prodgap t-1 -0.17*** -0.52*** -0.20** -0.63*** -0.11 -0.87*** 
 
(0.055) (0.142) (0.085) (0.135) (0.104) (0.191) 
Debt t-1 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) 
Debt X prodgap t-1 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.01 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) 
Inflation t-1 -0.10 -0.04 -0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.09 
 
(0.092) (0.157) (0.125) (0.186) (0.097) (0.151) 
Inflation X prodgap t-1 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 0.07 0.01 0.22 
 
(0.146) (0.265) (0.180) (0.288) (0.203) (0.350) 
N 2,281 2,281 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 
R2 0.125 
 
0.129 
 
0.206 
 AR(1) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
AR(2) 
 
0.181 
 
0.169 
 
0.259 
Sargan 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Number of instruments 
 
319 
 
286 
 
286 
Number of regions 249 249 216 216 216 216 
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 9: Further robustness checks for the macroeconomic variables 
 Dependent variable: regional 
productivity growth Without Spain Without Poland Without Ireland 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
FE 
System 
GMM FE 
System 
GMM FE 
System 
GMM 
              
Frontiergrowth  0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Productivity gap t-1 -2.17 3.33 -2.33 2.07 -2.13 3.08 
 
(2.035) (3.614) (1.948) (3.455) (1.986) (3.637) 
Trade t-1 -0.17*** -0.29*** -0.14*** -0.26*** -0.20*** -0.33*** 
 
(0.045) (0.073) (0.046) (0.076) (0.045) (0.075) 
Trade X prodgap t-1 -0.12** -0.38*** -0.12** -0.37*** -0.13*** -0.40*** 
 
(0.049) (0.109) (0.047) (0.113) (0.050) (0.113) 
Debt t-1 0.02 0.02 0.02* 0.03* 0.02* 0.03* 
 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) 
Debt X prodgap t-1 -0.02** -0.02 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) 
Inflation t-1 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 
 
(0.079) (0.121) (0.080) (0.128) (0.079) (0.124) 
Inflation X prodgap t-1 0.08 -0.04 0.14 0.18 0.03 -0.08 
 
(0.132) (0.206) (0.132) (0.212) (0.132) (0.211) 
N 2,309 2,309 2,355 2,355 2,474 2,474 
R2 0.095 
 
0.107 
 
0.112 
 AR(1) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
AR(2) 
 
0.245 
 
0.135 
 
0.131 
Sargan 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Number of instruments 
 
316 
 
319 
 
333 
Number of regions 246 246 249 249 263 263 
Dependent variable is regional productivity growth at the TL2 level.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by region. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix  
Fixed effects estimates of marginal effects of the macroeconomic variables: 
Figure A1: Marginal effects of macroeconomic variables, OLS. 
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Figure A2: Excluding frontier regions, OLS. 
 
Figure A3: Excluding top three regions, OLS. 
 
−.
4
−.
3
−.
2
−.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 tr
ad
e 
ex
po
su
re
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−.
1
0
.1
.2
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t d
eb
t
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−1
−.
5
0
.5
1
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 in
fla
tio
n
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
Macroeconomic indicators − F.E. − excluding frontier regions
Marginal effects on productivity growth
−.
5−
.4
−.
3−
.2
−.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 tr
ad
e 
ex
po
su
re
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−.
1
0
.1
.2
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t d
eb
t
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
−1
−.
5
0
.5
1
M
ar
gin
al 
ef
fe
ct 
of
 in
fla
tio
n
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
−4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −.5 0
Productivity gap
Macroeconomic indicators − F.E. − excluding top 3 regions
Marginal effects on productivity growth
 	 56	
Figure A4: Alternative frontier region, OLS. 
 
Figure A5: Excluding Spanish regions, OLS. 
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Figure A6: Excluding Polish regions, OLS. 
 
Figure A7: Excluding Irish regions, OLS. 
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